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The Brazilian Appellate Procedure 
through Common Law Lenses: How 
American Standards of Review May Help 
Improve Brazilian Civil Procedure  
Cesar Zucatti Pritsch* 
In this article, I discuss a flaw in Brazilian civil procedure 
observed in my practice as a Federal Labor Judge in Brazil, 
an issue that may be addressed by limiting appellate review 
in a similar fashion as the American courts do, using stand-
ards of appellate review. In Brazil, appellate courts tend to 
ignore the lower court’s decisions, replacing them for the 
ruling they would have made had they been the original de-
cision makers. A simple disagreement with the lower court’s 
findings of fact or discretionary rulings, no matter how rea-
sonable, is sufficient grounds for reversal. The lack of stand-
ards of review results in duplication of the trial court’s work 
at the appellate level, and provides excessive incentives for 
the parties to appeal. Parties often gamble for a different 
judgment, given the high odds of reversal that result from the 
lack of deferential standards of review. With such restrictive 
standards, the quantity and processing time of appeals 
would likely decline, relieving the overburdened Brazilian 
courts. The introduction of standards of review in Brazil 
would not face legal impediments. They are consistent with 
                                                                                                             
* Cesar Zucatti Pritsch is a Federal Judge for the labor courts of Brazil—Tribunal 
Regional do Trabalho da 4a Regiao. The author would like to thank Professor 
Mathew Mirow, of Florida International University College of Law, for reviewing 
this article. All Portuguese language terms and materials referenced were freely 
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constitutional due process guarantees, such as the reasona-
ble duration of process, and with the recent statutory re-
forms that limit the types and scope of appeals, and 
strengthen precedents. Additionally, the lack of an express 
statutory basis does not prevent Brazilian courts from per-
forming a more deferential appellate review, notwithstand-
ing the desirability of a nationally binding statute or court 
regulation, to achieve consistency. Changes in legal culture, 
such as the long-standing unrestricted appellate review in 
Brazil, are not easy, but the resulting flood of often trivial 
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3.  Does the introduction of appellate standards of 




The standards of appellate review may help improve Brazilian 
civil procedure, by reducing the quantity and processing time of ap-
peals, and by relieving the overburdened Brazilian courts. In Brazil, 
appellate courts tend to ignore the lower court’s decisions, replacing 
them for the ruling they would have made had they been the original 
decision makers.1 They do not defer to the trial judge’s decision.2 A 
simple disagreement in relation to the findings of fact, the applica-
tion of the law to the facts, or discretionary rulings by the lower 
court—no matter how reasonable those were—is sufficient for an 
appellate panel to reverse them.3 Such a situation provides excessive 
incentives for the parties to appeal.4 Parties often gamble for a dif-
ferent judgment, given the high odds of reversal.5 Unrestricted ap-
pellate review also makes the Brazilian judicial procedure less effi-
cient. Appellate judges repeat the work of the first instance courts, 
despite lacking the benefit of the immediate contact with the evi-
dence and with the realities of the trial court.6 The use of more def-
erential standards to review the fact-findings, the application of law 
to facts, and the discretionary rulings of the trial courts, as done in 
                                                                                                             
 1 Welber Barral & Rafel Bicca Machado, Civil Procedure and Arbitration, 
in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW 195 (Fabiano Deffenti & Welber Barral 
eds., 2011). 
 2 See generally Ben-Hur Silveira Claus et al., A Função Revisora dos 
Tribunais: A Questão do Método no Julgamento dos Recursos de Natureza 
Ordinária [The Appellate Courts’ Revising Function: A Question of Method in 
the Judgment of Ordinary Appeals], in 6 REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL DO 
TRABALHO DA 14ª REGIÃO [14TH REGIONAL LABOR COURT L. REV.] 161 (2010) 
(Braz.), available at http://legado.trt14.jus.br/Documentos/Revista_TRT14_2010
_n1.pdf. 
 3 See generally Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193-99. 
 4 Id. at 193 (stating that “appeals are used too often”). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 195. 
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the American appellate courts, could help make Brazilian civil pro-
cedure faster, with a more efficient distribution of power between 
appellate and trial courts.7 
In this article, I discuss an issue observed in my practice as a 
Federal Labor Judge (Juiz do Trabalho) in Brazil, which is common 
not only to the specialized civil procedure applied in the federal la-
bor courts (Justiça do Trabalho), but also to the procedure of all 
civil jurisdiction Brazilian courts. We will first discuss the Brazilian 
law and scholarship, showing the lack of appellate standards of re-
view in civil procedure. We will examine the unrestricted reviewing 
power of the appellate courts and its consequences, such as the ex-
cessive rate of appeals and the disregard of trial courts’ decisions, 
resulting in duplicative work, delay, and decrease in quality of ad-
judication. We will propose that the American standards of review 
serve as an inspiration for the Brazilian appellate procedure, in order 
to improve speed, simplicity, and efficiency. We will then discuss 
the operation of these standards in reviewing conclusions of law, 
findings of fact, discretionary rulings, and mixed questions of law 
and fact. Finally, we intend to examine the applicability of those 
standards to Brazilian law, assessing whether they would face any 
constitutional or legal impediment, and whether their implementa-
tion would actually require a statutory change. 
This policy article provides a window into Brazilian civil proce-
dure, its problems, and the efforts to overcome them through judicial 
reforms aided by comparative law. It is consistent with the trend of 
approximation between the civil law and common law traditions. 
This article’s goal is not to exhaust this intricate and sensitive theme, 
but only to raise awareness about it, contributing to the ongoing dis-
cussion about procedural law reform in Brazil.8 
                                                                                                             
 7 See generally Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of 
Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 235-42 (2009) (discussing 
the problems that the American standards of appellate review are designed to ad-
dress, which are analogous to the ones that the Brazilian justice system has to 
solve in order to improve appellate review). 
 8 Several reforms have been made in the last two decades to simplify appel-
late procedure, reducing the number of appeals and strengthening precedent, 
which have now been consolidated and extended in the new Code of Civil Proce-
dure, enacted in 2015 and effective in March of 2016. See infra notes 171-79 and 
accompanying text. 
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II. THE CURRENT UNRESTRICTED BRAZILIAN APPELLATE 
REVIEW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A. Brazilian civil procedure does not limit appellate courts’ 
power to review the decisions below 
In Brazilian civil procedure there are no juries, all findings of 
fact and law are made by judges.9 The losing party may appeal as of 
right, and the appellate courts review de novo both law and facts.10 
Appellate courts tend to ignore the lower judge’s decisions, replac-
ing them for the ruling they would have made if they were in the 
trial judge’s position.11 There is no law imposing standards of re-
view or deference to discretionary rulings or fact-findings of the 
lower courts.12 
The civil procedure applied in federal and state courts is gov-
erned by the national Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Processo 
Civil, hereinafter C.P.C.) and some non-codified federal statutes.13 
A special summary version of civil procedure (labor procedure) is 
applied by the federal Labor Justice (Justiça do Trabalho) to labor 
and employment cases. The Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consol-
idação das Leis do Trabalho, hereinafter C.L.T.) contains the core 
provisions of labor procedure, which are supplemented by the rules 
of the common civil procedure.14 
                                                                                                             
 9 Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil, in 1 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A 
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 191 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 
2002). For questions of fact that require technical knowledge, the judge uses the 
help of a court nominated expert (perito), who will submit a written statement and 
usually will not testify in a hearing. Each party may also produce their own expert 
statement (assistente técnico) to corroborate or rebut the court expert’s statement. 
See CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] arts. 156, 
465 (2015) (Braz.). 
 10 Rosenn, supra note 9, at 191. 
 11 Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See generally C.P.C., supra note 9. 
 14 CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] [CONSOLIDATION OF 
LABOR LAWS], art. 769. 
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In Brazil, an appeal will generally have two effects,15 the review-
ing effect (efeito devolutivo), which means the resubmission of the 
appealed issues to the judiciary,16 and the staying effect (efeito sus-
pensivo), which prevents the enforcement of the judgment until the 
appeal is decided.17 Although civil appellate review is limited to the 
issues raised by the appellant, the powers derived from the review-
ing effect are quite broad.18 The court’s adjudicatory power over the 
appealed issues is not limited to what is expressly argued in the ap-
pellate briefs, but extends to all questions related to the matter.19 The 
appellate court may decide all questions and arguments raised in the 
proceeding below, even if they were not completely decided by the 
trial court or transcribed in the briefs.20 Additionally, when a claim 
or defense is supported by more than one argument and the trial 
court rules favorably based on only one of them, the appellate court 
may review the other arguments.21 Finally, in the name of expedi-
ency, recent reforms have further broadened these powers of the ap-
pellate courts.22 When reversing a trial court’s order that dismissed 
a claim without adjudication on the merits, the appellate court may 
proceed to a first-hand ruling on the merits, without first remanding 
to the trial court—as long as it is a question of law or the case is 
ready (“ripe”) for immediate adjudication.23 
                                                                                                             
 15 C.P.C., art. 1012. See Welber Barral & Rafael Bicca Machado, Civil Pro-
cedure and Arbitration, in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW 183, 195 (Fabiano 
Defenti & Welber Barral eds., 2011). 
 16 C.P.C., art. 1013. 
 17 See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 195. In the labor appellate proce-
dure, the staying effect is exceptional. C.L.T., art. 899. 
 18 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1002. 
 19 3 MOACYR AMARAL SANTOS, PRIMEIRAS LINHAS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 
CIVIL [PRIMER ON CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 110 (7th ed. 1984) (Braz.). 
 20 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 1. 
 21 Id. at § 2. 
 22 See Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 
488 (1986). 
 23 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 3. The case is ready for immediate ad-
judication if the controversy is only a question of law or if it involves questions 
of law and fact capable of being proved by the evidence already produced to the 
records, without the need of further discovery or hearings. This is usually referred 
to as the ripe case theory (teoria da causa madura), and is very similar to the 
situation that triggers summary judgment in Brazilian civil procedure. See id. at 
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Neither the general jurisdiction civil courts nor the labor courts 
use standards that limit appellate review or that give deference to the 
decision of the court below. 24 Both the C.P.C. and the C.L.T. are 
silent in that matter.25 The decision of the appellate court simply re-
places the decision of the lower court below as to the issues on ap-
peal, to which the appellate court has full adjudicatory power, as if 
it were the trial judge.26 With equal powers to those that the trial 
court had when originally ruling, the appellate court decides both 
procedural issues (errores in procedendo) and on the merits (errores 
in iudicando).27 This ample review permits the appellant to raise the 
illegality or unfairness of the decision below.28 It also allows the 
appellate court to revisit all the evidence and findings of fact, and to 
either vacate or reform the decision.29 The appellate court does not 
consider the findings of fact or law below as presumptively cor-
rect.30 Since the entire record is in writing, and since additional evi-
dence on appeal may be admitted only in case of force majeure,31 
the appellate court tends to consider itself in as good a position as 
the trial judge to weigh the evidence, disregarding the importance of 
the witnesses’ demeanor.32 
                                                                                                             
art. 355. See ARRUDA ALVIM, ARAKEN DE ASSIS & EDUARDO ARRUDA ALVIN, 
COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [COMMENTS TO THE CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE] 1150 (2d ed. 2012) (Braz.). 
 24 See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. 
 25 See generally, C.P.C., supra note 9; C.L.T., supra note 14. 
 26 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1008. 
 27 SANTOS, supra note 19, at 112. 
 28 See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 194-97. 
 29 NELSON NERY JUNIOR & ROSA MARIA DE ANDRADE NERY, CÓDIGO DE 
PROCESSO CIVIL COMENTADO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED] 887, 
893 (11th ed. 2010) (Braz.). See also CARLOS HENRIQUE BEZERRA LEITE, CURSO 
DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL DO TRABALHO [COURSE OF LABOR PROCEDURAL LAW] 
565 (3d ed. 2005) (Braz.); MAURO SCHIAVI, MANUAL DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 
DO TRABALHO [MANUAL OF LABOR PROCEDURAL LAW] 804 (7th ed. 2014) 
(Braz.). 
 30 Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508. 
 31 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1014. 
 32 See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508. 
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Even with the new C.P.C. recently passed by the Brazilian Con-
gress and submitted to the President for final approval,33 (to be in 
effect after one year), the imposition of stricter standards of appel-
late review is not one of the projected changes. The new code repeats 
the pertinent language of the current C.P.C.34 
Despite many recent procedural reforms, Brazilian appellate re-
view is still within the civil law pattern.35 The lack of deference to 
the findings of the court below is not exclusive to Brazil. It is a typ-
ical feature of civil law jurisdictions, where the decision of the re-
viewing court generally replaces that of the lower court, instead of 
                                                                                                             
 33 The project was approved in the Senate, Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS) 
166 (Braz. 2010), received amendments by the House of Representatives, Projeto 
de Lei da Câmara dos Deputados (PLC) 8046 (Braz. 2010), returned to the Senate, 
and was then sent to the President for approval on February 13, 2015. See 
SUBSTITUTIVO DA CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS nº 166, de 2010, AO PLS nº 
166, de 2010 – CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL, SENADO FEDERAL, http://www
.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=116731 (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2017) (illustrating the legislative history of Senate Bill 166) . See also 
Kelly Buchanan, FALQs: New Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/0/falqs-new-brazilian-
code-of-civil-procedure/. 
 34 See the comparative table with the provisions of the current code compared 
to the versions of both chambers of Brazilian Congress and the final version ap-
proved. The project was approved in the Senate, Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS) 
166 (2010) (Braz.), received amendments by the House of Representatives, Pro-
jeto de Lei da Câmara dos Deputados (PLC) 8046 (2010) (Braz.), returned to the 
Senate and was sent to the President for approval on 2/13/2015. Quadro 
comparative do Código Processo Civil Projecto de Lei do Senado no 166, de 2010, 
SENADO FEDERAL, http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_c
od_mate=116731 (last visited Mar. 9, 2017). 
See also Senado Federal [Brazilian Senate], Novo CPC: mudanças que buscam 
agilizar processo entram na reta final para sanção [New CPC: changes that seek 
to streamline process enter the final stretch for sanction], SENADO NOTICIAS, http
://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/materias/2015/02/13/novo-cpc-mudancas-que-
buscam-agilizar-processo-entram-na-reta-final-para-sancao (last updated July 22, 
2015). 
 35 See generally Rosenn, supra note 22. See also infra notes 171-79 (discuss-
ing recent reforms that brought Brazil many steps closer to the common law tra-
dition, but not involving standards of review). 
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remanding for further proceedings.36 Rather than being primarily a 
method of correcting mistakes of law—as in common law jurisdic-
tions—in the civil law tradition appeals are usually considered a 
right, which includes the mere reconsideration of factual and legal 
issues.37 In a civil law jurisdiction, an appellate court is generally 
expected to reexamine all the evidence and independently reach its 
own conclusion about the truth of the facts and their legal signifi-
cance.38 
B. Consequences of the unrestricted scope of appellate review 
in Brazil 
In Brazil, appeals are used excessively, burdening the entire sys-
tem.39 The vast majority of the trial courts’ orders are appealed, 
causing appellate judges to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of 





                                                                                                             
 36 Peter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions, in 16 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch.8 
¶ 3 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1982). 
 37 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 121 (3d ed. 2007) 
 38 Id. 
 39 When Less is More, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2009), http://www.econo-
mist.ecom/node/13707663 (explaining that the reason why Brazil’s courts are the 
most overburdened is due to the limitless right to appeal). 
 40 CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA [NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], 
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 
2013: LABOR JUSTICE] 111, 117, 120, 240, 249 (2014) (Braz.); CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA [NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 
2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013: FEDERAL JUSTICE] 
87, 91, 93, 99, 183, 187 (2014) (Braz.); CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA 
[NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA 
ESTADUAL [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013: STATE JUSTICE] 121, 115, 130, 
136, 139, 274, 280 (2014) (Braz.), available at http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/prog
ramas/justica-em-numeros/jn2014_completo.zip. See also Barral & Machado, 
supra note 1, at 193. 
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Appeals Against Brazilian Trial 





Rate of External Appeals from Trial Court 
Decisions 
69.1% 18.9% 8.4% 
Success Rate of Appeals from Trial Court 
Decisions 
52.5% 39.5% 36.2% 
New Cases per Appellate Judge  1,226 3,726 1,294 
Total Workload per Appellate Judge (in-
cluding cases pending from previous years) 
2,119 12,619 2,712 
Total Appeals Decided 642,760 469,174 2,122,148 
Total Appeals Filed 648,478 499,244 2,098,490 
 
As to the Labor Justice, more than two thirds of the trial court 
orders are appealed.41 The odds are high for at least a partial reversal 
of the decision below, 52.5%.42 On the plaintiffs’ side, that adds up 
a very strong incentive to appeal, along with the fact that most of the 
plaintiffs are exempted from judicial costs,43 and that they usually 
retain their attorneys on a contingency fee basis.44 Thus, plaintiffs at 
the Labor Justice have good chances of improving their positions on 
appeal at almost no cost, a perfect combination to allow excessive 
and sometimes meritless appeals. On the other hand, employers—
the typical defendants before the Labor Justice—do not fit the costs 
exemption rule, they must deposit a bond of approximately $ 3,000 
(that goes towards payment in case the judgment is affirmed) and 
they pay their attorney’s fees during the litigation.45 Experience 
                                                                                                             
 41 JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO, supra note 40, at 240. 
 42 Id. at 249. 
 43 Mostly, they have lost their jobs and have no income or earn low wages, 
fitting the poverty requirement for the exemption (justiça gratuita). See CNJ 
Serviço: quem tem direito à Justiça gratuita?, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA 
(June 01, 2016), http://www.cnj.jus.br/noticias/cnj/82962-cnj-servico-quem-tem-
direito-a-justica-gratuita. 
 44 C.f. Rosenn,supra note 22, at 519 (“Fee arrangements totally contingent 
upon the success of litigation are not used and would be regarded as a violation 
of the attorney’s ethical duty to charge a fair amount for his services.”). 
 45 C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 899, § 1 (establishing that in order to appeal, 
the parties must deposit a bond corresponding to the amount of the judgment, up 
to ten times the monthly minimum wage, currently circa $ 300). Even though such 
appeal bond rule does not make any distinction among the parties, practice shows 
66 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:3 
 
shows that employer-defendants are less likely than plaintiffs to ap-
peal reasonable judgments, given the costs of continuing the suit. 
However, too often defendants also do appeal reasonable decisions, 
to gamble with high odds of succeeding, and to perform a conven-
ient procrastination of payment (post-judgment interests are much 
lower than average market interest rates for loaning the same 
amount of a given judgment). 
As to the State and Federal Justice systems, the apparent low rate 
of appeals is misleading and deserves qualification. Those percent-
ages are not based only on the rate of appeals against the main trial 
court orders. An infinity of minor interlocutory decisions are also 
counted in the pool of appealable decisions, causing the relative rate 
of appeals to look smaller. If the percentages counted only the ap-
peals from the main decisions, such as injunctions or final trial court 
orders, the rate would likely be similar to that of the Labor Justice. 
That is shown by the high absolute number of new appeals that both 
federal and state appellate judges face every year—in fact more than 
the ones assigned to the labor appellate judge.46 
A simple calculation illustrates the gravity of the situation. If 
each labor or state appellate judge receives more than 1,200 new 
cases a year, in order to keep up with the incoming flow of work 
(and hopefully reduce the pending docket from previous years), each 
judge will have to write at least three or four opinions a day, 7 days 
a week, 365 days a year. This workload pressure is even higher when 
discounting vacation periods and weekends, and when considering 
the time dedicated to oral arguments, to review, debate and join or 
dissent from opinions of the same panel peers, and to attend to en 
banc or administrative court duties. Federal judges face even more 
cumbersome problems. The number of new cases and pending ap-
peals in federal court is three times the amount presented in labor 
and state courts.47 Despite the fact that a considerable amount of the 
                                                                                                             
that, because most of the plaintiffs that sue at the Labor Courts are unemployed 
or near-minimum-wage workers, they usually file their complaints in forma pau-
peris, and therefore may comfortably appeal without posting any bond. 
 46 JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40, at 87; 
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40, at 130. 
 47 Compare JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40, at 
91, with JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO, supra note 40, at 
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issues in federal appeals are repetitive questions of law48—which 
are faster to solve because of the application of the court’s prece-
dents—the numbers suggest that the federal appellate court system 
is also under great workload pressure. 
A final caveat in relation to the numbers mentioned above is that 
the nationally averaged data about solved cases and new cases may 
also be misleading. Although the appellate courts are adjudicating 
at approximately the same rate as new appeals are filed, when con-
sidered as a group (which would in theory at least prevent the sys-
tem’s collapse), each court has a very different performance. De-
spite national efforts to level the courts’ structure and resources, and 
to demand more and more productivity, some courts are thriving 
while others are falling behind. In 2013, 60% of the state appellate 
courts solved fewer appeals than the number of new appeals filed in 
the same period.49 The same happened to the labor appellate courts 
in 50% of the Brazilian states and 80% of the federal appellate 
courts.50 Thus, there is urgent need for measures that will relieve 
appellate courts of Brazil and give them room for performing better. 
The situation illustrated above is the result of a complex array of 
factors, one of them being the lack of stricter standards of appellate 
review, which is the focus of the present study. Other factors in-
clude, for instance, the provisions of the C.P.C. and C.L.T., which 
allow different and successive appeals; the usual lack of binding 
precedents allowing for the proliferation of disagreements between 
                                                                                                             
117, and JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40, at 136 
(12,619 new cases in Federal Justice, as compared to 2,110 in Labor Justice and 
2,712 in State Justice). 
 48 Those repetitive questions of law used to be appealed over and over, in part 
because of the traditional lack of binding precedent in Brazilian law. This situation 
has been subject to reforms in the last two decades that made available several 
procedural tools for solving these repetitive appeals, and for strengthening prece-
dents, progressively departing from the typical civil law tradition. As the table 
above shows, however, those reforms were not sufficient to solve the problem of 
excessive appeals and other flaws of Brazilian judicial system. With the new 
C.P.C. in effect, besides keeping the recently reformed provisions, Brazil will fi-
nally be adopting the stare decisis principle, aiming to make litigation faster and 
cheaper, avoiding duplicative work in adjudicating the same legal issues. See 
generally infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text. 
 49 See JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40. 
 50 See JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40. 
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lower and higher courts; the low costs for filing an appeal; and the 
insufficiency of the penalties for meritless appeals.51 Further, in 
some cases, such as in judgments above a certain value against pub-
lic entities, appellate review is even mandatory (remessa 
necessária).52 When the parties themselves do not appeal, the trial 
judge is required to submit the case to the appellate court and cannot 
enforce the judgment unless the order is affirmed by the appellate 
court.53 Nevertheless, among all those factors, the unrestricted ap-
pellate review is one of the major reasons for the congestion in 
courts, and it has not yet been subject to any attempt of legislative 
reform. 
Because of this unrestricted power of reviewing the decisions of 
trial courts, appellate judges tend to discard the lower court’s rea-
sonable findings and rulings, unless these are exactly the same ones 
the appellate judges would have reached if they were the original 
                                                                                                             
 51 Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. In relation to the traditional lack 
of binding precedent and the progressive introduction of stare decisis, see supra 
note 27, infra notes 102-110, and accompanying text. As to the lack of deterrence 
against meritless appeals, see Barral & Machado, supra note 7, at 193. In relation 
to the excessive opportunities to appeal, in 2005 the art. 522 of the former C.P.C. 
was amended to restrict interlocutory appeals (agravo de instrumento) to situa-
tions when the lack of immediate appeal may cause serious and difficult-to-repair 
harm. CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 522 
(1973) (Braz.). Interlocutory decisions that do not cause such harm may be chal-
lenged with a written objection is allowed (agravo retido), to be examined by the 
appellate court along with the eventual appeal from the final decision. Within the 
specialized civil procedure applied to the labor courts, appeals are less numerous. 
Interlocutory appeals were never permitted. To preserve an error for appeal, the 
aggrieved party must object (protesto anti-preclusivo) verbally in writing. The 
merits of an interlocutory decision are reviewed only upon an appeal from the 
final judgment. See C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 893. The new C.P.C. will also 
go further limiting the situations where an appeal is possible. 
 52 C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 496. 
 53 Id. This is true unless the decision was based in the superior courts’ prece-
dents, or unless the judgment is below a certain value, which was previously 
equivalent to $18,000.00. Such low value caused most of the judgments against 
government entities to be appealed, making governments some of the main “cli-
ents” that overload the courts. That problem is addressed by the new C.P.C., 
which raises such threshold to approximately $27,000.00 for municipalities, 
$135,000.00 for states, and $270,000.00 for the federal government. Id. at art. 496 
§ 3. 
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judge.54 That approach ignores that all application of law carries 
some inherent subjectivity and discretion, and that the function of 
the appellate courts is to review, and not to retry the case.55 As some 
Brazilian labor judges noted: 
Despite the inherent interpretative activity in the ap-
plication of law, some appellate opinions seem more 
like a new trial court decision than an act of revision 
because they virtually ignore the first instance deci-
sion. They transcribe the main statements of the 
pleadings and examine the facts and evidence, as if 
the appellate court was the first recipient of the evi-
dence and of the procedural debate. It is as if the la-
borious work from which the trial court decision re-
sulted could be simply disregarded. Such an attitude 
stems from a misunderstanding about what is the re-
vising function of the appellate courts (object), a mis-
conception that also reflects on their decision-mak-
ing process (method). The result that follows from 
the use of this method of adjudging an appeal is in-
evitably the increase in the number of reversals of the 
first instance decisions. It could not be any different. 
The method itself induces reversal because it over-
looks an inherent feature of the legal phenomenon: 
the interpretative nature of the application of law, 
and the necessary discretion of the decision-maker.56 
This undervaluing of the first instance decisions creates exces-
sive incentives for the parties to appeal. Given the high rate of re-
versions, losing parties likely view the appeal as an opportunity to 
have their case decided by a panel where the judges may simply dis-
agree with the lower court’s ruling. Since, in Brazil, the costs of ap-
peal are not high and sanctions for meritless appeals are not com-
monly sustained,57 the losing party is tempted to take her chances on 
                                                                                                             
 54 Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508 (explaining that the appeal is a trial de novo, 
and any findings of fact or law by the lower court are not presumptively correct). 
 55 See generally Claus et al., supra note 2. 
 56 Id. at 179-80. 
 57 Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. 
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an appeal, no matter how reasonable the appealed decision was. 
With more incentives to appeal, cases that could end in a much 
shorter time are dragged through an often-lengthy sequence of ap-
peals. 
The greater quantity and length of appeals, duplicating the work 
done at the trial courts, tends to overburden the already congested 
appellate courts, causing delay and the decrease in quality of appel-
late decisions. In Brazil, appellate judges amount to approximately 
twenty percent of the totality of the judges.58 If most of the cases 
decided below are to be tried de novo at the appellate level, the much 
fewer appellate judges, naturally, will be unable to repeat the lower 
courts’ work. As an inexorable result, either the adjudication of ap-
peals takes longer, or the quality of review decreases, because of the 
shorter time appellate judges dedicate to each case, and with the ex-
cessive delegation to multiple law clerks. 
One of the main justifications for the right to appeal is its func-
tion as a procedural safeguard to protect citizens from error and in-
justice in trial court decisions.59 However, it is pointless to try to 
achieve such goal through an ample unrestricted review by appellate 
courts equally prone to error due to the same congestion faced at the 
lower level. It ends up that the more procedural safeguards created 
to prevent error (more types of appeals or more sweeping appellate 
review), the more inherently unfair the system ultimately becomes. 
The lengthier and more numerous appeals tend to affect dispropor-
tionately the parties who are not economically able to endure a 
lengthier and costlier process. The excess of safeguards turns against 
the system.60 
An unrestricted review of the facts by the appellate courts—dis-
tant from the evidence—without deference to the trial court’s find-
ings, also contradicts the immediacy principle.61 According to this 
traditional principle of procedural law, the decision-maker should 
                                                                                                             
 58 See Rosenn, supra note 9, at 192-94. 
 59 See SCHIAVI, supra note 29, at 17. 
 60 Claus et al., supra note 2, at 187 (quoting MAURO CAPPELLETTI. PROCESO, 
IDEOLOGIAS E SOCIEDADE 278-79 (1973) (Arg.)). 
 61 Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59. 
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preferably have direct contact with the evidence, to be better posi-
tioned to decide.62  When the case reaches the appellate level, a full 
review of the findings of fact based merely on the written records 
sacrifices the immediacy between the evidence and the decision-
maker.63 The appellate judges cannot mentally transport themselves 
to the situation of the trial courtroom. The transcripts and other writ-
ten records are insufficient to convey the complex facts that happen 
at a trial, as a judge present in loco would perceive.64 This is espe-
cially true for the first-hand impressions acquired from directly ob-
serving and listening to the witnesses’ testimony.65 Because the trial 
judge is better positioned to assess a witness’s credibility, his or her 
decision should deserve deference. 
Surely, the assessment of witness’s credibility does not rely en-
tirely on demeanor.  The internal consistency of the testimony, in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation, and the capacity to observe 
and report correctly are factors that do not necessarily require per-
sonal observation by the fact finder. Corroboration and contradic-
tion of the witness’s testimony by other evidence also do not depend 
on demeanor. However, many issues of fact do depend upon weigh-
ing conflicting testimonies, where the witness’s demeanor plays a 
great part in the credibility assessment, which cannot be captured in 
a written record and conveyed to the reviewing court.66 An appellate 
court relying solely on the record is handicapped in deciding issues 
of fact.67 
Additionally, the unrestricted appellate review hinders the en-
forcement of procedural rules. The high reversion rate of reasonable 
                                                                                                             
 62 LEITE, supra note 29, at 566. 
 63 Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Claus et al., supra note 2, at 176-77. 
 66 Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59. Additionally, even though 
testimonies may also be recorded on video and accessed online, only a few trial 
courts have adopted such practice. One of the issues raised against this practice is 
that the review of the recorded testimonies would be also very time consuming 
and duplicative of the trial court’s work, not furthering the goal of reducing con-
gestion. Thus, almost always the Brazilian appellate judges will rely only upon 
the written records to decide and are not in an ideal position to appraise the wit-
nesses’ credibility. 
 67 Id. 
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discretionary rulings reduces the effectiveness of the judge’s at-
tempts to deter misbehavior or procrastination. Much of the neces-
sary decision power is transferred to appellate judges, despite their 
distance from the realities of the trial court. 
This is especially true with interlocutory decisions. When the 
court grants leave for interlocutory appeals (agravo de instru-
mento),68 the lenient standard of review and high rates of reversal 
deprive the trial judge of the necessary coercive power to enforce 
good faith in the proceedings. When interlocutory decisions are not 
immediately appealable and the party files a mere objection (agravo 
retido69 or protesto anti-preclusivo,70 to be reviewed later, along 
with the appeal on the merits), the problem is less egregious. In this 
case, the only immediate way to challenge them is the writ of man-
damus, which in Brazil is stricter in scope.71 Notwithstanding, par-
ties still may procrastinate the compliance to injunctive orders—
which in Brazil are coerced through per diem fines (astreintes), but 
not imprisonment—expecting to have them dissolved by the appel-
late court pursuant a writ of mandamus. 
When an appeal from final judgment is filed, procedural issues 
not yet resolved and appropriately preserved are also decided.72 At 
this juncture, the interlocutory decisions become appealable and 
thus now vulnerable to the unrestricted review by the appellate 
court. For instance, rulings excluding a witness or an expert written 
opinion (because irrelevant, duplicative or unnecessary) is often re-
versed and the case remanded so that the trial court hears that evi-
dence and amends its decision appropriately. A higher degree of def-
erence to the trial courts discretionary procedural decisions would 
                                                                                                             
 68 See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 196-97 
 69 Agravo retido is the objection from an interlocutory decision in the general 
civil procedure. Id. 
 70 Protesto anti-preclusivo is the objection from an interlocutory decision in 
the specialized labor procedure. 
 71 When no appeal is immediately available, an interlocutory decision may 
also be challenged through the writ of mandamus (mandado de segurança), if it 
violates certain and definite rights (direito líquido e certo), a much stricter scope 
of review than in interlocutory appeals. See Lei No. 1.533, de 31 de Dezembro de 
1951, Diário Oficial da União de 31.12.1951 [D.O.U. ] arts. 1-3 (Braz.). See also 
infra note 94, and accompanying notes. 
 72 See supra note 51 (interlocutory appeals). 
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reduce these duplicative proceedings and discourage the parties 
from insisting on irrelevant or excessive evidence. Another example 
is when an appellate court reviews the application of procedural 
sanctions. It tends to presume the good faith of the sanctioned party 
and too often reverse the sanctions under a de novo standard of re-
view, instead of presuming that the trial judge ruled correctly (be-
cause closer to the situation) and deferring to such decision. 
III. AMERICAN STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The American standards of review are consistent with the Bra-
zilian trend of reforms to make litigation faster, cheaper and more 
efficient.73 They could inspire legislative change, or even persuade 
the courts to create, through precedent, a self-restrained approach to 
appellate review. One of the main shortcomings of the civil law legal 
systems is the deep disregard for the first instance courts’ decisions 
and the glorification of appellate courts, a defect not present at the 
Anglo-Saxon common law system.74 The pragmatism embodied in 
the American standards of appellate review would increase the re-
spect for the facts found by the trial courts and focus appeals mostly 
on errors of law. In the American legal system, appellate courts do 
not adjudicate disputes between parties; they only review decisions 
of other courts about those disputes.75 Similarly to appeal in Brazil, 
it encompasses only the issues raised by the appellants that were 
sufficiently preserved for review and that actually affect the rights 
of parties, not the so-called harmless errors.76 However, the Ameri-
can appellate courts are further limited by the standards of review,77 
a feature not present at the Brazilian appellate procedure. 
A standard of review is “the level of deference given by the re-
viewing court to another tribunal’s action or ruling,”78 a “measuring 
                                                                                                             
 73 See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text (reforms and current debates 
on Brazilian civil procedure law). 
 74 Claus et al., supra note 2, at 187 (quoting MAURO CAPPELLETTI. PROCESO, 
IDEOLOGIAS E SOCIEDADE 278-79 (1973) (Arg.)). 
 75 Peters, supra note 7, at 235. 
 76 See Walter H. Sargent, The Meaning of Standard of Review, APPELLATE 
PRACTICE IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS § 3.01 (2014). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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stick” that defines the depth of review and assigns power among ju-
dicial actors.79 Appellate courts’ authority over a trial court’s ruling 
is limited by the standards of review, requiring appellate judges to 
use self-restraint in their own decision-making.80 
The reasons usually raised for use of standards of review in the 
American legal system include the balance of power among judges, 
the efficiency of the judicial system, consistency and predictabil-
ity.81 First, while the trial court judge is better suited as a first-hand 
observer, fact finder, and litigation manager, the appellate court is 
focused in ascertaining whether the trial court correctly applied the 
law.82 Standards of review help judges respect each other’s 
strengths, assigning balanced power among judicial actors and force 
the appellate court to recognize that the decision reached below 
should be the final unless containing a harmful error.83 Second, a 
deferential standard of review furthers judicial economy, protecting 
the appellate court’s time and resources.84 Standards of review pre-
vent the repetition of the trial on appeal, simplify and improve the 
review process.85 By reducing the number of issues on appeal, the 
appellate court may spend more time on a careful review of the is-
sues on appeal.86 Third, a standardized review process helps reach 
consistency between the decisions, as each appellate judge sees the 
appealed issues from the same angle.87 Finally, standards of review 
provide predictability and notice to the parties interested in appeal-
ing of what to expect on appeal.88 A more realistic view about the 
                                                                                                             
 79 Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Ap-
peals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 268-69 (2005) (quoting John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages 
and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J. 801, 810 
(1976)). 
 80 Peters, supra note 7, at 235. 
 81 Id. at 238-42. 
 82 Id. at 235. 
 83 Id. at 235-36, 238. 
 84 Id. at 240-41. 
 85 Id. at 241. 
 86 Peters, supra note 7, at 241. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 241-42. 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 75 
 
chances of winning makes it less likely that a frivolous appeal is 
filed, and encourages appellate settlements.89 
The standards of appellate review are far from being a precise 
test or formula. Many nuances or shadings of a spectrum pass under 
each single standard of review phrase.90 Most of the jurisdictions 
apply four major standards of review as markers along this spec-
trum.91 A legal error is reviewed de novo (anew) with the trial 
court’s decision receiving little, if any, presumption of correctness 
or deference.92 In reviewing the trial judge’s fact-findings, a more 
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review is applied.93 “A 
finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”94 
Even more deference is given to jury fact-findings, which are re-
viewed for substantial evidence—”such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable person mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion.”95 Finally, the most lenient standard is abuse of discretion, of-
ten used to review procedural matters decided by the trial court,96 
which may be found when the decision is clearly unreasonable or 
arbitrary.97 
A. Questions of law 
In the American judicial system, the trial court judge’s determi-
nations of law are not entitled to any formal deference by appellate 
courts, which is called a review de novo (anew).98 For the parties 
                                                                                                             
 89 Id. at 241. 
 90 See id. at 243. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Re-
view in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 279, 
282 (2002). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948)). 
 95 Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)). 
 96 Peters, supra note 7, at 243. 
 97 Id. Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 286. 
 98 Id. 
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wishing to appeal, that is the easiest hurdle to overcome, theoreti-
cally a fresh start where the debate begins “anew.”99 
The use of the term de novo is actually a misnomer, implying 
that there is a determination of the matter “as if it had not been heard 
before and no decision had been rendered.”100 De novo review actu-
ally means that the appellate court has the power and competency to 
reach a different conclusion with no particular deference the deci-
sion below,101 independently reviewing conclusions of law and re-
versing them when there is a legal error.102 However, an appellate 
court does not “start from scratch,” but rather starts with careful con-
sideration of the trial court’s work.103 The lower court’s “view of the 
legal effect of the fact pattern before it is not to be lightly disre-
garded.”104 There is a presumption that the trial court’s decision was 
correct, which most appellants fail to overcome. Additionally, a par-
ticular judge’s reputation or expertise may incline an appellate court 
to review this judge’s legal determinations with more or less confi-
dence,105 and a well-written trial court opinion examining thor-
oughly the law on a new issue may be very persuasive.106 
B. Questions of fact 
In the American federal civil procedure, in which many state 
court systems are also inspired, the trial judge’s “[f]indings of fact, 
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to 
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”107 
As the Supreme Court stated, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ 
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
                                                                                                             
 99 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04. 
 100 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 291. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Childress, supra note 79, at 274. 
 103 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 291 (quoting Key Pharms. v. 
Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 104 Id. (quoting Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1481 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
 105 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04. 
 106 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 290. 
 107 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 77 
 
that a mistake has been committed.”108 A reviewing court should not 
reverse the finding of the trial judge “simply because it is convinced 
that it would have decided the case differently.”109 Actually, if the 
finding is reasonable in light of the record, the appellate court “may 
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the 
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where 
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s 
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”110 
That applies also to physical or documentary evidence, not only 
witness credibility. Deference to trial court is not due only to its su-
perior position to assess credibility, but also because of its expertise 
in fact-finding and to the division of labor between the courts, avoid-
ing the duplication of efforts.111 However, the Supreme Court rec-
ognizes that even more deference is due under the clearly erroneous 
standard to findings based upon the credibility of witnesses.112 
The question, under a clear error standard, is not whether the 
findings were correct, but rather whether they were clearly wrong.113 
As it is a very lenient standard, when the trial court’s fact-findings 
are unfavorable, in a settled area of the law, there is little chance to 
win on appeal.114 An appellant would have to show that the findings 
“lack any rational connection to the record or that the vast weight of 
the evidence” to render a finding certainly wrong, which is rare.115 
C. Jury findings 
While the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to bench 
trial findings of fact, the findings by the jury are more difficult to set 
aside, being reviewed under the substantial evidence test.116 Jury 
findings of fact are generally insulated from review by the Seventh 
Amendment, which states, “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 108 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 109 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 
 110 Id. 573-74 
 111 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04). 
 112 Id. (referencing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575). 
 113 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 299. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 307. 
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re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”117 According to the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50, a finding by a jury cannot be set aside unless there is 
“no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to make 
such a finding.” To assess such sufficiency the court should review 
“all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the jury’s verdict without making credibility determina-
tions or weighing the evidence.”118 
This sufficiency test is often referred to as “substantial evi-
dence.”119 Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence taken from 
the record as a whole that might be accepted by a reasonable mind 
as adequate to support the finding under review.120 It does not imply 
a great quantity or strength of evidence, just enough evidence allow-
ing reasonable minds to disagree (thus a proper issue for the jury to 
decide), and not a mere “scintilla of evidence,” which is insufficient 
to present a question for the jury.121 The test only requires reasona-
bleness from the jury.122 If a finding is unreasonable (impartial rea-
sonable minds could not differ as to its erroneousness), then such 
finding becomes reversible.123 
However, the jury verdict is not itself the object of the appellate 
review. Rather, the object of review is the trial court’s ruling on the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, where the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting that verdict was challenged.124 Thus, even 
though such ruling is technically a legal determination, reviewed de 
novo by the appellate court, it is unlikely to be reversed on appeal 
because it depends on the highly deferential standard of review, re-
quiring mere sufficiency of the evidence.125 
                                                                                                             
 117 U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
 118 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-51 (2000)). 
 119 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 286. 
 120 Id. at 308 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938)). 
 121 Id. at 309. 
 122 Childress, supra note 79, at 331. 
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D. Mixed questions of law and fact 
Mixed questions of law and fact are “questions in which histor-
ical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, 
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to 
put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the estab-
lished facts is or is not violated.”126 Therefore, the “mixed question” 
is what remains after the historical facts and the applicable rule of 
law was established under their respective standards of review—the 
application of such rule to the facts.127 There is “no rigid rule” about 
what standard of review to apply to mixed questions.128 A “deferen-
tial review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it 
appears that the district court is ‘better positioned’ than the appellate 
court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scru-
tiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”129 
Usually, the free review of legal conclusions while deferring to 
underlying facts may be the clearest way to approach mixed find-
ings.130 For instance, in Eighth Amendment cases, whether a fine is 
excessive requires the application of a constitutional standard to the 
concrete facts, which is reviewed de novo.131 Some courts say that 
the application of law to fact is freely redone on appeal, which 
makes sense if law is made in the process, but often the application 
is simply the fact-finding function that the Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 52 protects.132 These courts probably meant that application 
of law is reviewed de novo where the court develops the legal stand-
ard.133 
As one commentator proposed, based on the Supreme Court 
precedents, a mixed finding of law and fact should be reviewed free 
of the restrictions of Rule 52(a) when this finding requires the re-
finement or interpretation of a complex legal rule in the application 
                                                                                                             
 126 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). 
 127 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 
1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). 
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of that rule to clear historical facts.134 If the rule, although undis-
puted in the abstract, is uncertain or bound up with sensitive matters 
of public political policy, the appellate courts are competent to re-
view it broadly, furthering its institutional and corrective func-
tion.135 However, upon the application of a definite and noncontro-
versial legal rule to complex findings of fact, where trial court’s ar-
ticulated findings may not represent fully the complex bundle of ev-
identiary data and credibility determinations, the appellate court 
generally is not in a good position to review the legal characteriza-
tion of such historical facts.136 The application of such legal rules to 
the facts should be characterized as factual inferences, and its appel-
late review should be subject to the restrictions of Rule 52(a).137 
E. Discretionary rulings 
In deciding procedural matters—such as discovery disputes, trial 
schedules, motions for continuances, objections, equitable relief or 
sanctions—there is usually no one right way to rule. The trial court 
has a range of alternatives that are permissible under the legal rule 
and appellate courts ordinarily defer to a discretionary ruling unless 
it is outside such acceptable range—where the trial court “abused” 
its discretion.138 The term “abuse” of discretion does not mean bad 
faith, or outrageousness in the trial court’s ruling, and does not im-
ply that an appellate court will reverse only gross errors.139 All it 
means is that an appellate court cannot set aside a discretionary ju-
dicial ruling, unless it has a “definite and firm conviction that the 
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 135 Charles Richard Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate 
Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. 
Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403, 425 (1983). 
 136 See Childress, supra note 79, at 276. 
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court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion 
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”140 
An appellate court will be predisposed to affirm such decision. 
The abuse of discretion standard reflects the rationale that discre-
tionary decisions are best left to the trial court, given this court’s 
superior knowledge of the record, proceedings, and people in the 
case, and given that an abstract legal rule cannot anticipate all the 
infinite variety of situations in which such decisions may arise.141 
Typically, a discretionary decision will be reversed when the trial 
court did not conform to enunciated standards in exercising its dis-
cretion (for example, granting a preliminary injunction and ignoring 
the traditional four-factor test),142 when it based its decision on a 
legal error or on incorrect factual findings, or when it failed to ex-
plain the reasons for its decision.143 
IV. APPLYING THE AMERICAN STANDARDS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW TO BRAZILIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. Would standards of review be useful to improve Brazilian 
civil procedure? 
To assess the applicability of standards of review to Brazilian 
civil procedure, the first question is whether they would be useful—
whether they would help to achieve the goals of procedural law, 
such as fairness, expediency and efficiency. The answer is affirma-
tive. Although these standards are not part of the present Brazilian 
legal culture, the problems that they are designed to solve in the 
United States are also present in Brazil.144 A more rational division 
of labor between trial and appellate courts avoiding the duplication 
of efforts would also be welcome in Brazil, where most of the cases adjudged at first instance 
courts are appealed, overburdening the courts.145 The Brazilian judicial system would also largely 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. 
 141 See Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 310. 
 142 Id. at 311 (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 
908 F.2d 951, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. 
 145 Compare id., with Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (quoting Anderson, 470 
U.S. at 573, 575). 
82 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:3 
 
benefit from the recognition that the trial court is in a better position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, and its proximity to the record, proceedings, and people 
in the case, recommend deference to its reasonable findings of fact 
and discretionary choices. As it happens in the United States, lower 
odds of reversing reasonable trial court decisions would reduce the 
incentives to appeal and cause a natural selection of the stronger 
cases to be appealed.146 That would save precious judicial resources, 
which could be directed to performing a faster and better adjudica-
tion of the more meritorious appeals. 
As to the de novo standard applied in reviewing questions of law, 
that is already the rule in Brazil—except that in Brazil this is usually 
the only standard, an unrestricted review with no deference to the 
lower court’s decision, even in factual or discretionary matters.147  
That standard should be maintained in relation to questions of pure 
interpretation of the law. Deferring to the diverse and possibly con-
flicting interpretations of a rule of law given by several trial courts, 
no matter how reasonable these interpretations may be, would natu-
rally result in uncertainty and counter the trend of unifying prece-
dents in Brazil.148 Claimants in similar factual situations would 
likely yield inconsistent results in different courts under the same 
rule of law.149 Divergences in the interpretation of the law naturally 
arise between the courts, and appellate review is needed exactly to 
ensure precedent uniformity, and the resulting equal treatment of the 
citizens.150 Further, resolving disagreements in interpretation of the 
law reduce uncertainty as how it is to be applied, one of the major 
causes of litigation.151 An unrestricted de novo review of legal is-
sues, in that sense, furthers the goal of obtaining consistent and uni-
form interpretation of the law across the country, in harmony with 
the effort to unify judicial precedents. 
As to the substantial (or sufficient) evidence standard, despite its 
usefulness as part of a comparative study of the American appellate 
                                                                                                             
 146 See Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 310. 
 147 Rosenn, supra note 22, at 507. 
 148 See Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 90. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 83 
 
system, this standard is not really applicable to the civil appellate 
procedure in Brazil, where the jury is restricted to homicide cases.152 
In relation to discretionary decisions, though, the need for 
change is urgent. Trial court judges are not supposed to be automa-
tons governed in every minute detail by exhaustive rules. There are 
legitimate discretionary choices to be made within the limits of the 
law, and the reviewing courts should not be fast to interfere.153 The 
American “abuse of discretion” standard appropriately respects 
these legitimate choices, and reinforces the institutional strengths of 
both the appellate and trial courts. The trial judge is responsible for 
keeping the court’s docket under control, ensuring quality and rea-
sonable processing speed.154 The judge’s procedural discretionary 
decisions, within the legally permissible range, are based in his or 
her experience as to what is effective to balance expediency, fair-
ness, and the enforcement of good faith during proceedings.155 
Therefore, when a panel of appellate judges substitute a reasonable 
discretionary choice of the trial judge for the one they would have 
made if they were the trial judge, they end up harming the effective-
ness of the whole system.156 That results from the unnecessary du-
plication of the work and because parties and attorneys start to per-
ceive the trial judge as powerless, just a passage to the real decision 
makers, the appellate judges. As in the United States, the Brazilian 
                                                                                                             
 152 Rosenn, supra note 22, at 191. 
 153 Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch.8 ¶ 104. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Since discretionary rulings are frequently interlocutory decisions, the re-
striction of interlocutory appeals acts to give some deference to these rulings. See 
id. In the Brazilian general civil procedure, interlocutory appeals are permitted 
only when the lack of immediate appeal may cause serious and difficult-to-repair 
harm, while in labor procedure they are never available, and parties sometimes try 
to use the much stricter writ of mandamus, see supra note 42. A writ of mandamus 
is often used to bypass such restriction, but its scope of review much stricter (clear 
and certain right), giving deference to the trial court’s discretionary rulings, but 
only until the correspondent objections to these rulings are reviewed together with 
the appeal from final decision. Therefore, despite being initially protected from 
attack, many interlocutory decisions are easily overturned on the final appeal, 
such as decision excluding evidence (cerceamento de defesa), and sanctions for 
bad-faith litigation (litigância de má-fé). 
 156 Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch.8 ¶ 90. 
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appellate courts should be predisposed to affirm reasonable discre-
tionary decisions, absent a clear error of judgment. 
For analogous reasons, the findings of fact of trial judges should 
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. The American formula-
tion avoids the easy reversion simply because the appellate panel is 
convinced that it would have decided differently.157 In an overbur-
dened system, as in Brazil,158 ignoring the reasonable factual find-
ings of the trial judge is a luxury that reduces the efficiency of the 
proceedings, while adding very little in terms of fairness to the sys-
tem. Who can say that the right finding of fact is that of the appellate 
judges and not the reversed one, of the trial court? The rationale for 
the unrestricted review is that possible errors—committed by over-
burdened trial judges—would likely be corrected by a panel of more 
experienced judges. However, such argument fails where the system 
itself causes these appellate judges to be equally or even more over-
burdened, and where they have the disadvantage of not being able 
to observe the witnesses. Thus, a finding of fact should rarely be 
reversed—only when such finding is clearly wrong, lacking any ra-
tional connection to the record or to the vast weight of the evidence. 
Finally, the so-called mixed questions of law and fact raise the 
greatest challenge, because there is no uniform rule to their standard 
of review.159 In the United States, courts have been dealing with the 
issue for decades, and it is part of the American legal culture.160 The 
lack of consistency does not defeat its application, as courts are used 
to developing legal concepts by slowly refining them through bind-
ing case-by-case precedents, a typical feature of the common-law 
system. 
However, when it comes to transporting such legal concept to 
another country, consistency is key—or at least a clear and workable 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. 
 158 See Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Reform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 19, 27 (1998) (explaining the “extraordinary degree” of the problem that ex-
ists in Brazil). 
 159 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 316-17. The application of a 
rule of law to the historical facts found to be true, after those have already been 
established under their respective standards of review. See supra notes 76-83 and 
accompanying text. 
 160 Id. at 319. 
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rule. In Brazil, courts sometimes also introduce and refine legal con-
cepts through the progressive build-up of precedents. Despite the 
fact that these precedents were not usually binding, they were al-
ways persuasive and often ended up codified by the legislators. 161 
Thus, the issue here is not whether the Brazilian have the power to 
adopt and refine a new idea, but whether this idea is sufficiently 
clear and persuasive at the outset to conquer sufficient support and 
ensure its adoption. 
The application of law to facts is inherent to any judicial deci-
sion. Usually, the decision will hinge on whether a rule applies to a 
specific type of factual circumstance, a determination that, by itself, 
might be useful to defining the reach of such rule for application in 
future cases. In other cases, the application of law to the facts is more 
of a case-by-case fact-intensive assessment of peculiar circum-
stances in light of a well-defined legal standard.162 If application of 
law to facts were always reviewed de novo, it would leave very little 
room for deference to the reasonable decisions of the trial judges in 
those fact-intensive cases where they are better positioned to decide 
and that bear little interest for the unification of precedents.163 On 
the other hand, using a “clearly erroneous” standard for all mixed 
questions of law and fact would swallow the rule of de novo review 
for questions of law, since all law suits involve the application of 
rules of law to facts.164 It would also give excessive deference to 
trial courts, compromising the consistency of the system by allow-
ing reasonable, but divergent, decisions to be shielded from reversal, 
something that the recent reforms in Brazilian civil procedure are 
exactly trying to eliminate.165 
                                                                                                             
 161 Precedents in Brazil are still considered persuasive authority, except for the 
binding súmulas or for the precedent unification tools recently introduced. That 
situation will change when the new C.P.C. comes into effect, in 2016, introducing 
stare decisis as a general principle in Brazilian civil procedure. See infra notes 
171-79 and accompanying text. 
 162 Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 318. 
 163 Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 164 C.f. id. at 318-19. 
 165 Id. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States acknowledges that there 
is “no rigid rule” about mixed questions standard of review.166 The 
Court stated that a “deferential review of mixed questions of law and 
fact is warranted when it appears that the [trial] court is ‘better po-
sitioned’ . . . to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate 
scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”167 That 
seems to be the clearest enunciation of a workable rule as to the re-
view of the trial judge’s application of law to facts. Presumptively, 
there will be a predominant legal question reviewed de novo, but 
when it is a case-by-case fact-intensive determination of no interest 
for precedent unification and refinement, the lower decision should 
receive deference and not be disturbed unless “clearly erroneous.” 
B. Is it possible to apply the American standards of appellate 
review to Brazilian civil procedure? 
After establishing the convenience of using standards that limit 
appellate review, making the system more rational and effective, the 
next question is whether their introduction in the Brazilian legal sys-
tem would face any impediment. The answer is negative because 
there is a favorable environment for changes in Brazilian civil pro-
cedure, the lack of a correspondent statutory rule does not prevent 
appellate judges from performing a more deferential review, and 
there is no conflict with any constitutional principle or statutory pro-
vision. 
1. Receptivity of the Brazilian legal system to solutions based 
on comparative law 
In Brazil, there is a favorable environment for changes that pro-
mote efficiency in civil procedure, including ideas based on com-
parative law. The last twenty years have seen several reforms focus-
ing on the limitation of appeals and a progressive march towards 
precedent unification and binding effect. Additionally, there is a de-
                                                                                                             
 166 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 318. 
 167 Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 
499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)). 
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bate on the necessity of empowering the trial courts by giving def-
erence to their reasonable decisions, and a national policy of the ju-
diciary branch to empower the trial courts by balancing budget and 
infrastructure, and by encouraging innovative practices. 
For roughly two decades, Brazilian civil procedure has been a 
laboratory for reforms that attempted to remove the causes that pre-
vented the judiciary from providing a fast, inexpensive and effective 
service. Precedents of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.)168 and 
the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (S.T.J.)169 became basis for sum-
mary rejection of agravos170 based on conflicting jurisprudence. 
They also became basis for summarily granting the agravos and the 
underlying appeals when the appealed decision is inconsistent with 
such precedents.171 Additionally, all appellate courts were granted 
the power to summarily dismiss appeals clearly inadmissible, mer-
itless or against precedents of the same court or of the superior 
courts.172 In 2005, an amendment to the Constitution brought greater 
changes to the judiciary branch, including the limited introduction 
                                                                                                             
 168 The S.T.F. is the constitutional court of Brazil. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102. (Braz.). 
 169 The Superior Tribunal de Justiça (S.T.J.) is the highest court for issues of 
federal non-constitutional law. See C.F., supra note 168, at art. 105. 
 170 Agravos here are limited appeals against decisions of intermediate appel-
late courts that dismissed extraordinary or special appeals. The extraordinary ap-
peal (recurso extraordinário) is directed to the S.T.F. and is restricted to direct 
offenses to the constitution (it cannot be, for instance, a violation to federal law 
that only indirectly also violates de Constitution). See id., at art. 102, III. The spe-
cial appeal (recurso especial) is directed to the S.T.J. and is restricted to violations 
of treaties and federal law, as well as inconstant interpretation of federal law be-
tween intermediate appellate courts. See id., at art. 105, III. 
 171 Both extraordinary and special appeals are subject to an initial screening 
(exame de admissibilidade) at the intermediate appellate courts, who may dismiss 
them for non-compliance with their legal requirements. Such decision is not final, 
and the party may still challenge it with an agravo, a limited appeal that takes 
such screening directly to the S.T.F. or S.T.J. C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1042. 
 172 C.P.C. (1973) supra note 51, at art. 557, §1º-A, introduced by Lei no. 
9.756, de 17 de Dezembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
Besides the S.T.J., the other Brazilian superior courts are the Tribunal Superior 
do Trabalho (T.S.T., labor jurisdiction), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (T.S.E., elec-
tions) and Tribunal Superior Militar (T.S.M., for military cases). C.F., supra note 
168, at art. 92. 
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of binding precedent for the S.T.F., the súmula vinculante173—a na-
tionally binding version of the decades-old practice of creating black 
letter rule statements that summarize the main legal principles repet-
itively held in the S.T.F. opinions.174 The same amendment also in-
troduced the general repercussion (repercussão geral) requirement 
to all the extraordinary appeals, allowing the S.T.F. to pick only the 
more relevant cases and mandating the application of its constitu-
tional issue holding to all the similar cases pending in the country.175 
Additionally, the current C.P.C. was changed so that the parties can-
not appeal a trial court decision that is consistent with the súmulas 
of the S.T.F. and S.T.J.,176 and cases may be summarily dismissed 
by trial courts when the controverted issue is a pure question of law 
already ruled unfavorably by that same court.177 In 2014, similar 
                                                                                                             
 173 C.F., supra note 168, at art. 103-A, introduced by amend. 45 (2004). 
 174 “Brazil does have the institution of the súmula, which began in the S.T.F. 
[Brazilian Supreme Court] in 1964 and has since spread to other tribunals. It is a 
numbered series of capsulized legal rules, usually only one sentence in length, 
summarizing the holding of the court. These norms are enshrined in the súmula 
only after the case law has ‘firmed up’ in a specific direction. Most deal with very 
ordinary questions of law. Typical is No. 554, which provides: ‘Payment of a 
check, issued without provision for funds, after receipt of the criminal accusation 
is no obstacle to proceeding with the criminal action.’ These case law rules float 
freely, almost totally disembodied from the facts of the cases upon which they are 
based. These rules are technically not binding on judges lower in the hierarchy, 
but they are usually followed because failure to do so usually assures summary 
reversal.” Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Reform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 19, 26-27 (1998) (citations omitted). The Brazilian legal system—as the civil 
law systems in general—traditionally did not adopt the stare decisis principle. De-
parting from this tradition, in an effort to reduce congestion of the intermediate 
and superior appellate courts, there have been legislative reforms strengthening 
precedents, such as the creation of the S.T.F. binding súmulas, as well as reforms 
that gave the other high courts’ súmulas the effect of barring appeals when the 
decision below is consistent with a súmula. See supra notes 101-104, and accom-
panying text. Finally, the approved new C.P.C. completes the transition to binding 
precedents, similarly to common law jurisdictions, effective in March of 2016. 
See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 175 C.F. supra note 168, at art. 102 §3, introduced by amend. 45 (2004); 
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1035 (Braz.). 
 176 C.P.C. (1973), supra note 51, at art. 518 §1, introduced by Lei no. 11.276, 
de 7 de Fevereiro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
 177 C.P.C. (1973), supra note 51, at art. 285-A, introduced by Lei no. 11.277, 
de 7 de Fevereiro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
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tools to reduce the number of appeals and unify precedents were in-
troduced into the labor procedure.178 Finally, the procedural code 
itself was entirely revamped. 
The recently approved New C.P.C. not only embraces the im-
provements mentioned above, but goes a great step further, address-
ing many of the long debated problems of Brazilian civil procedure. 
One of its main new features is the attachment of binding effect to 
the appellate and high court opinions, in a similar fashion as the 
common law countries, a major approximation of Brazil to that legal 
tradition.179 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the adoption of 
common law inspired standards of review would face any rejection 
because of its foreign origin. Brazil has long departed from being a 
traditional civil law jurisdiction and is quite open to solutions that 
may be found in other legal systems, as the reforms mentioned 
above exemplify. 
Further, Brazilian judges have been raising a debate over the 
need, not only for change of legislation, but also for awareness of 
the roles of trial and appellate courts, where appellate courts review 
and not retry the case, deferring to the trial courts’ reasonable deci-
sions.180 A similar thesis has been approved by a significant amount 
of federal labor judges in 2012, during the 16th National Congress 
of Labor Judges (CONAMAT).181 
                                                                                                             
 178 Lei no. 13.015, de 21 de Julho de 2014, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
 179 See Senado Federal [Brazilian Senate], Exposição de Motivos [Advisory 
Committee Notes], ANTEPROJETO DO NOVO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL 
[PROJECT OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 11-33 (2010) (Braz.), 
available at http://www.senado.gov.br/senado/novocpc/pdf/anteprojeto.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014). See also C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 1. 
 180 See generally Claus et al., supra note 2. 
 181 “Systemic deference to trial court decisions. Reviewing function of the ap-
pellate courts. Respected the conviction and independence of each judge, the La-
bor Courts will defer to the credibility assessment of witnesses by the trial courts. 
The lack of systemic deference to the decisions of the trial judge contributes de-
cisively to the congestion of the appellate courts. The principle of immediacy 
leads to the presumption that the credibility assessment of witnesses by the trial 
judge is appropriate. Measures shall be taken to enhancement systemic deference 
to the first instance decisions (translation by the author).” Available at http://an
amatra.tempsite.ws/conamat2012/tesesaprovadasconamat.asp, last access in 
11/15/2014. 
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Lastly, the idea of empowering the trial courts as a means to 
make the entire system more efficient is also in harmony with the 
public policy set by the National Council Justice (CNJ),182 the Na-
tional Policy of Priority Attention to the First Instance Courts (Pol-
ítica Nacional de Atenção Prioritária ao Primeiro Grau de Ju-
risdição). That policy involves the coordination of local and national 
actions to balance budget and workforce between the first instance 
and the appellate courts. It also aims to provide adequate infrastruc-
ture and information technology to trial courts, encourage trial 
judges to participate in the administration of the judiciary, and re-
ward the best practices and innovative projects that further the pol-
icy.183 
2. Inexistence of constitutional or legal impediments to the 
use of restrictive standards of review in Brazilian civil 
procedure 
The lack of a statutory rule introducing and regulating standards 
of appellate review does not prevent judges from applying a defer-
ential review based on a systematic interpretation of the legal sys-
tem, notably constitutional principles. On the other hand, no consti-
tutional principle or statutory provision bar the immediate adoption 
of such standards by the Brazilian courts. However, a statutory 
change expressly introducing them in the Brazilian civil procedure 
would ensure the uniform adoption, best furthering the goal of re-
ducing the burden on appellate courts and improving the efficacy of 
the entire system. 
Even though in Brazil it is not possible to find entire bodies of 
law created by judges in the vacuum of statutory rules, such as in 
the common law countries, Brazilian judges do have a great deal of 
                                                                                                             
 182 The Conselho Nacional de Justiça is the highest administrative and disci-
plinary organ of the Brazilian judiciary, and it is made of fifteen members: one 
justice of the S.T.F., one of the S.T.J. and one of the T.S.T., three appellate and 
three trial court judges, two prosecutors, two attorneys and two citizens of notable 
legal knowledge. See Composição atual, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/sobre-o-cnj/composicao (last visited Nov. 26. 2014). 
 183 CNJ, Resolution 194 (2014) (Braz.), available at http://www.cnj.jus.b
r/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/resolucoespresidencia/28659-resolu-
cao-n-194-de-26-de-maio-de-2014 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
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liberty to interpret the existing law and to fill gaps in creative man-
ners, as the circumstances require. The French Revolution’s dogma 
that the Judiciary branch should only apply—and not interpret—the 
law designed by the Legislative branch has long been proven im-
practicable and abandoned. In Brazilian current post-positivist and 
neo-constitutionalist legal culture, 184 judges are expected to ensure 
full normative force to the constitutional principles. Using them as 
a compass while filling the gaps in the legal system, judges are free 
to interpret the existing statutes in light of such principles or even to 
find those statutes void when they violate a constitutional princi-
ple.185 Here, the observance of standards of review furthers a con-
stitutional right—the right to a reasonable duration of process and 
to the means that will ensure its celerity, especially when the Brazil-
ian Constitution states that fundamental rights and guaranties are 
immediately applicable. 186 Additionally, it is not uncommon that 
new legal concepts and institutes in Brazil are, in a first moment, 
discussed in scholarship and introduced in vanguard decisions, only 
later earning progressive support and being formally codified. 
Judges in Brazil usually cite scholarship (doutrina) for support on 
issues with no statute on point, and both scholarship and judges do 
use comparative law as a source. Comparative law is indeed ex-
pressly listed as a gap-filling source of law by the C.L.T.187 
Additionally, there is no constitutional or legal impediment to 
the adoption of standards of review in Brazil. There is neither an 
express or implied constitutional principle, nor statutory provisions 
                                                                                                             
 184 See Luís Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e constitucionalização 
do Direito. O triunfo tardio do Direito Constitucional no Brasil. 10 JUS 
NAVIGANDI 851 (Nov. 1, 2005) (Braz.), available at http://jus.com.br/artigos/
7547. 
 185 See, e.g., Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human 
Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INTL. 
& COMP. L. REV. 331, 356 (2012). 
 186 See C.F., supra note 168, at art. 5, LXXVIII, included by amend. 45 (2005) 
(“To all, in judicial and administrative proceedings, are assured a reasonable du-
ration of proceedings and the means to guarantee the celerity of proceedings”); id. 
at art. 5, § 1 (“The provisions that define the fundamentals rights and guarantees 
have immediate application”), available at http://www.v-brazil.com/government
/laws/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 187 C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 8. 
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that bars the adoption of standards of review by the Brazilian courts. 
Let us examine the issue in face of the judge’s independence guar-
antee, the double degree of jurisdiction principle, and the language 
in the C.P.C. that regulates appeals. 
Standards of review do not affect judicial independence. As one 
of the guarantees of a democratic regime, judicial independence 
aims at providing judicial decisions free from pressure, be it from 
the organized society, from political or economic interest groups, or 
from other courts.188 In Brazil, judicial independence is embodied in 
the judgeship guarantees of life tenure, irremovability, irreducibility 
of pay,189 and immunity as to the content of the judicial opinions.190 
A limitation of the appellate review power does not affect the 
judges’ independence because it merely changes the distribution of 
that decision power between judges. It does not subject them to pres-
sure or undue influence to decide in a certain way or another. Just as 
the binding súmulas allocate more power to the S.T.F.,191 eliminat-
ing the lower courts’ power to ignore the S.T.F.’s súmulas,192 here 
there would be a reduction of the decision power of appellate courts 
and the correspondent increase at the trial courts, whose decisions 
would more likely be final. 
Standards of review also do not affect the double degree of ju-
risdiction principle, because it does not mean that appeals are unre-
stricted or that every decision is necessarily appealable, but merely 
the possibility of judicial review by higher courts. It cannot be taken 
                                                                                                             
 188 See generally Jorge Luiz Souto Maior & Marcos Neves Fava, A Defesa de 
sua Independência: Um Dever do Magistrado, 123 REVISTA DE DIREITO DO 
TRABALHO 67 (2006) (Braz.). 
 189 C.F., supra note 168, at art. 95. 
 190 Lei Complementar no. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 41 (establishing that judges cannot be punished or prejudiced 
due to their opinions or content of their decision, except in case of improbity or 
excesses in language). 
 191 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (binding súmulas). C.F., 
supra note 168, at art. 103. 
 192 Id. Under an overreaching comprehension of what independence of the ju-
diciary means, causing cases on issues already pacified by the S.T.F. to be dragged 
up for years only to be later reversed by the S.T.F. 
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too far, causing unnecessary delay, which especially benefits delin-
quent debtors.193 Although courts and scholarship are split on 
whether this principle has constitutional status or not, it is generally 
agreed that it is not absolute. The legislation may establish condi-
tions for appeals (pressupostos de admissibilidade), such as posting 
a bond (depósito recursal), or even may eliminate certain appeals, 
such as with some small claims.194 Extensive changes have already 
limited the scope of appeals in light of higher courts’ precedents.195 
The double degree principle does not conflict with the standards of 
review when many other restrictions have already proven its rela-
tiveness. Additionally, standards of review do not even restrict par-
ties from appealing, but only change the thought process of the de-
cision-makers, reducing the likelihood of reversals. 
Finally, there is no language in the Brazilian civil procedure 
rules that prevent the use of standards of review. The reviewing ef-
fect (efeito devolutivo)196 means only that an appeal has the effect of 
resubmitting a case to the judiciary branch after a final judgment.197 
It does not relate as to whether the decision method of the appellate 
courts is unrestricted or more deferential. Similarly, when art. 1008 
of the C.P.C. mentions that the decision proffered by the appellate 
tribunal replaces the appealed trial court decision, it also does not 
touch upon the method through which the appellate ruling is 
reached. It merely indicates that the source of authority is now the 
appellate decision, and not the appealed one, even if the appellate 
court simply confirmed the decision below.198 It is generally under-
stood that the appellate courts have full adjudicatory power over the 
issues raised on appeal, as if it were the trial judge.199 However, such 
power is not granted by the procedural statute, it is a mere conse-
quence of the lack of an express restriction of the method of review. 
                                                                                                             
 193 SCHIAVI, supra note 29, at 806. 
 194 Id. at 809. 
 195 Novo CPC: mudanças que buscam agilizar processo entram na reta final 
para sanção, supra note 34. 
 196 See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text (reviewing effect). 
 197 Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 195. 
 198 NERY JUNIOR & NERY, supra note 29, at 886. 
 199 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (broad adjudicatory powers 
of appellate court). See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508. 
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Therefore, nothing in the procedural legislation bars the adoption of 
standards of review. 
3. Does the introduction of appellate standards of review in 
Brazil require legislation change? 
After assessing the utility and possibility of introducing stand-
ards of review in Brazilian civil procedure, the final issue is whether 
it would require a change in the current legislation. 
The answer is negative. 
Since there is no constitutional or legal impediment, judges are 
free to pursue a systematic interpretation that provides immediate 
application to constitutional principles, such as the reasonable dura-
tion of process.200 Judges must fill the gaps of the system to ensure 
full normative force these constitutional principles.201 In light of that 
constitutional canon and considering the allocation of the task of 
hearing witnesses at the trial level, the principle of immediacy (be-
tween the evidence and the decision-maker) requires that the assess-
ment of the evidence by the trial judge is presumed correct.202 Ad-
ditionally, procedural law allows the judge discretion as a tool to 
deal with the variable factual situations that arise in a process. The 
best choice for the trial court may be one, and for the appellate panel 
another, despite both being correct.203 Allowing this mere diver-
gence to cause the reversal of a reasonable decision is a waste, vio-
lating the principles of the reasonable duration of process, judicial 
economy, and efficiency.204 
A systematic interpretation of the Brazilian legal system, in-
formed by the comparative law discussed in this article, leads to the 
presumption of correctness of the reasonable trial court’s findings 
of fact and discretionary rulings. As a result, the use of the standards 
                                                                                                             
 200 See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text (judicial interpretation en-
forcing constitutional principles). 
 201 See Barroso, supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 202 See supra note 181 and accompanying text (presumption of adequate cred-
ibility assessment of witnesses by trial judge). 
 203 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (range of correct alternatives in 
a discretionary decision). 
 204 C.F., supra note 168, at art. 37. 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 95 
 
of review clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion is available even 
without change in current Brazilian legislation. 
Despite the possibility, however, the introduction of appellate 
standards of review through judicial interpretation might initially 
bring inconsistency when adopted by some appellate courts’ panels 
and not by others, yielding disparate results. Such problem though, 
could be solved in relatively short time with the unification of such 
precedents through the edition of a súmula for that issue, which 
would then be followed by the entire appellate court (and in 2016, 
when the new C.P.C. comes into effect, binding also all subordinate 
lower courts). A connected solution would be its inclusion in the 
court’s Internal Regiment (Regimento Interno).205 Finally, though 
statutory change expressly introducing standards of review is not 
essential, it would be desirable, ensuring their consistent adoption, 
furthering the goal of improving the efficacy of the entire system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Any change in legal culture is difficult, especially when such 
change affects a long-standing feature, such as the unrestricted ap-
pellate review. However, the recognized shortcomings of that sys-
tem, clogged with often trivial or meritless appeals, impose a change 
in the paradigm. 
Brazilian civil procedure does not limit appellate court’s powers 
to review the decisions below, which are made de novo on both law 
and facts. With broad reviewing powers, appellate courts tend to ig-
nore the lower court’s decisions even when absolutely reasonable, 
replacing them for the ruling they would have made if they were a 
new trial court decision, and not a revision. That misconception re-
sults in a method of adjudging that inevitably increases the number 
of reversals. The high rate of reversals creates excessive incentives 
to appeal, making the proceedings longer, the number of appeals 
higher, and the work duplicative of what have been already done at 
the trial courts, overburdening the system and wasting valuable re-
sources. It also transfers the decision power to the appellate courts—
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who are not as well-positioned to assess witness credibility—and 
makes it more difficult for the trial judge to enforce procedural rules. 
The American standards of review are a possible solution for 
these problems, promoting the efficiency of the system, with a well-
balanced allocation of power between the courts in respect to fact-
findings and discretionary rulings. Standards of review are the level 
of deference given by the reviewing court to another tribunal ruling. 
A legal error is reviewed de novo (anew) with no deference, the trial 
judge’s fact-findings are not disturbed unless clearly erroneous, and 
the discretionary rulings are affirmed unless there is abuse of discre-
tion. The application of law to facts (mixed question of law and 
facts) is usually reviewed de novo, except when such application is 
very fact-intensive and not contributive to clarifying the legal doc-
trine. 
The introduction of appellate standards of review in Brazilian 
civil procedure would not face any impediment. They are consistent 
with constitutional due process guarantees, such as the reasonable 
duration of process, and with the recent statutory reforms that limit 
the number and scope of appeals, and strengthen precedents. Addi-
tionally, the lack of an express statutory rule does not prevent Bra-
zilian appellate judges from applying a more deferential standard of 
review. The systematic interpretation of the Brazilian legal system, 
informed by the comparative law, leads to the presumption of cor-
rectness of the reasonable trial court’s findings of fact and discre-
tionary rulings, which should merit deference. Although the intro-
duction of these standards through judicial interpretation might ini-
tially bring some inconsistency, their inclusion in the court’s inter-
nal regiment or the use of precedent unification tools could provide 
the desired consistency. Further, statutory change limiting appellate 
review would be the most desirable option, ensuring uniform adop-
tion nationally and furthering the goal of reducing congestion and 
improving the entire system. 
 
